ZIRP: Zero Interest RANGE Policy December 16, 2008
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…exceptionally low levels…for some time…
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Historic Fed Day December 16, 2008
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…3 more minutes to go.

Deflation shifts to second gear September 10, 2008
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Following the announcement of the FNM/FRE bailout, I saw the good ol reflation trades (buy eur, stocks, gold, crude…sell usd, treasuries) immediately dominate overnight trading…not such a great start to the week considering that my positions are all deflation trades. As my PnL bled overnight, I asked myself one question over and over again: when will the Fed finally begin its anti-deflation (reflation) campaign? Will they cut next week as an immediate follow up to the bailout? With deflation about to seriously intensify, Bernanke has two options: ease now or ease later. The Fed has only 200bp to work with, so Bernanke may take a risk and let the deflationary phase play out a little longer. I also wonder if we will see a drop in CPI or PPI any time soon. My current strategy and market timing is focused on this deflation-to-reflation theme. For now, it seems like the mainstream is just starting to pick up on the possibility of deflation.
Failed monetary policy August 22, 2008
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Business cycles are a natural phenomenon of human behavior within a free market economy; this is the hallmark of the Austrian Business Cycle theory. The Fed was created after the Great Depression to smooth out future business cycles. Setting history aside, today’s Fed has done everything but smooth out market fluctuations. The two charts below show how the Fed slashed rates in response to the bursting of the Tech bubble, only to realize (too late) that they created yet another bubble in the housing market. Unfortunately, the housing bubble also created many other bubbles in the economy (retail, auto, manufacturing, services, banking etc.) Bubble, bubble, bubble…too many are popping right now, causing a 1930s deflationary scare.
Treasury promises to buy Fannie and Freddie equity July 14, 2008
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I talked about the possibility of a reflation attempt in the near future, and we just might see it. Despite the 250bp rate cuts and “innovative” credit facilities by the Fed, we have yet to see a full blown monetization effort by the government. Fannie and Freddie own over $5 trillion of US mortgages, and the government will do anything to maintain market confidence; this is just the beginning of the end. Bear Stearns is nothing compared to the current problem, because the potential systemic risk goes beyond the financial markets; the full faith and credit of the US government is on the line. At times like these, I’m amazed at how schizophrenic the market can be. Just last month, Bernanke was mouthing that downside risk had diminished, and that he was considering rate hikes to support a strong dollar. HA! Indeed this whole situation is very sad, and a lot of people’s lives are going to be ruined because of it. But seriously, Wall St and Main St should have seen this coming.
ECB Vicious Cycle July 2, 2008
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A prelude to tomorrow’s ECB meeting (25bp hike all but certain).
From Macro Man

Indeed, the ECB is fighting a lonely battle. Despite risk to growth stability, I guess they are doing the right thing. As the German finance minister during the 1960’s once said:”price stability may not be everything, but without price stability, everything is nothing.” A rate hike by the ECB, coupled with weak payrolls, will probably send euro to record highs.
Bank of Korea intervention July 2, 2008
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Apparently BOK sold about $3b into the market yesterday to prop up the Korean Won. Inflation is out of control in my home country, and it will be interesting to see how far the government will go to support the Won. Maybe the government doesn’t really understand economics, but Korea’s inflation is a product of printing money to buy dollars so that exporters (Samsung, LG, Hyundai) can benefit from a cheap Won. I remember when the Won was at 900 last year, people were complaining about its negative impact on exports…now that the Won is above 1000, people are complaining about inflation. Frickin make up yo mind foo.
Shift in Fed tone: slightly dovish June 17, 2008
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It’s about midnight right now, and euro/usd has rallied more than 70 pips since today’s NY close. The catalyst seems to be a shift in the Fed’s hawkishness, with some senior Fed officials worried that the market has overreacted on Bernanke’s dollar jawboning.
To put this in poker context:
Market: call…
Fed (trying to bluff): raise 25bp…
Market: re-raise 75bp!
Fed: uhhh…I fold
What dollar rally? Trichet crushes Bernanke June 5, 2008
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This week, Bernanke stepped up his support for the greenback during a conference in Spain and a class day speech at Harvard’s graduation ceremony. Stating “significant concern” over the falling dollar’s impact on inflation, Bernanke made it clear that the Fed is done cutting rates. His remarks sparked a sharp sell off in bonds and commodities, with crude falling about $8 and gold falling about $30. However, all of Bernanke’s efforts became undone overnight when Trichet of the ECB explicitly opened the possibility of a rate hike during the ECB’s next meeting in July. The dramatic reversal is evident in the charts of EUR/USD and crude below. This is truly: in your face. The Fed might as well stop talking about holding/raising rates because we are about to see Credit Crisis Part II, while the housing market continues to derail in a slow motion train wreck.
Below is a three-year chart of the USD index. Do you see the dollar rally everyone’s been talking about?
(Im)Balance of Payments November 12, 2005
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William Poole, the president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, recently denounced any concerns regarding the US current account deficit. Many economists in fact agree that there is no real concern for a ballooning current account deficit. They argue that it is a sign of strength in the US economy and high foreign demand for US assets. In the short term, this argument may hold as it did during the 1980s. But the real question is whether the current account deficit can be sustained over the long run.
Before we talk about the current account deficit, it is important to go over the definition of the balance of payments (BoP). The BoP accounting is simliar to most balance sheets, with every item booked as a credit or a debit. Post-gold standard BoP is always zero, and the “deficit” we hear in the news can only show up in the BoP’s major sub balances.
CA (current account) = net trade in goods + net trade in services + net investment income + unilateral transfer
CF (capital/financial account) = capital imports – capital exports
BoP = CA + CF – ΔR = 0
BoP = CA + CF = ΔR (change in reserve account)
A current account deficit simply means that a country is spending more than it produces in a given period. This extra spending is only possible when there is a surplus in the capital account. Of course, a current account deficit may not be completely offset by a capital account surplus. During the gold standard, the capital account was strictly tied to the central bank’s gold base, which provided an automatic mechanism for keeping the BoP of each country in equilibrium. Therefore a deficit in the BoP required readjustment in the current account, whereas today, ΔR is seen as a form of compensatory financing (negaitve sign in the equation because it implicitly represents capital exports).
Murray Rothbard on David Hume’s price-species flow:
As the philosopher and economist David Hume pointed out in the mid-eighteenth century, if one nation, say France, inflates its supply of paper francs, its prices rise; the increasing incomes in paper francs stimulates imports from abroad, which are also spurred by the fact that prices of imports are now relatively cheaper than prices at home. At the same time, the higher prices at home discourage exports abroad; the result is a deficit in the balance of payments, which must be paid for by foreign countries cashing in francs for gold. The gold outflow means that France must eventually contract its inflated paper francs in order to prevent a loss of all of its gold. If the inflation has taken the form of bank deposits, then the French banks have to contract their loans and deposits in order to avoid bankruptcy as foreigners call upon the French banks to redeem their deposits in gold. The contraction lowers prices at home, and generates an export surplus, thereby reversing the gold outflow, until the price levels are equalized in France and in other countries as well.
In the post-gold standard economy, not only can deficit financing be achieved through foreign direct investment (FDI – raise equity), but the US can also discharge its deficit by accumulating debt through its own currency. The US “borrows” by selling dollars to foreign central banks (mainly Asian), who in turn buy US debt. These central banks will gladly stock up dollar reserves, as it is the international reserve currency and allows their domestic currencies to be artificially low (think RMB). These dollar reserves will eventually purchase dollar denominated US assets, especially US government bonds and agency debt (only 30% go into FDI). It is important to note here that foreign sales of US treasuries implies additional liquidity, as the US is tapping into foreign credit and not domestic savings. Furthermore, this type of expansion allows creditor nations (i.e. China) that stock up forex reserves to flood the global market with cheap goods, implying that instead of a price inflation, a bubble emerges in the asset markets. Indeed, the buying and selling of debt instruments are at the core of expanding global liquidity.
In today’s dollar standard, a lagging capital account is offset by ΔR, which depicts central bank acquisition of dollars to achieve balance. Therefore, changes in market prices for currencies and interest rates are supposed to provide the necessary equilibrium mechanism for the BoP. This assumes that all countries have a floating exchange rate regime, which is in fact far from reality. The dollar has indeed depreciated since 2000, but this is only minimal considering the fact that most Asian countries, especially China, have their currencies hard-pegged to the dollar.


Finally, it is important to look into the somewhat neglected portion of the current account – international investment income. The first graph depicts US net international investment position (NIIP), where foreign investments in US assets were worth $2.5 trillion more than foreign assets owned by the US in 2004. Despite this massive gap, however, the US still earned $30 billion dollars more investment income than foreigners in 2004. This was possible because the US mainly invests in foreign equities, whereas foreign countries (i.e. Asia) mainly invest in US government bonds and mortgage-backed federal agency debt (a la Fannie Mae). Considering the massive gap in NIIP, however, this scenario will not last long. In the second quarter of this year, US income payment has already exceeded income receipt by $455 million. This red number is registered as a debit in the current account. Therefore, as the trade account continues its deficit, a negative investment income will exacerbate the current account deificit. Not only will this have a serious consequence on the value of the dollar, but it will also raise many doubts on the dollar’s role as the international reserve currency.
On a side note, we believe that ΔR of the BoP formula may provide a good reference to global liquidity, and thus global demand. We have been hearing news of declining global demand based on year over year data. We therefore intend to formulate a difinition of money supply that incorporates M3 and ΔR in order to make sure that our long positions don’t get squeezed by a fall in global demand.


















